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Free Appropriate Public Education Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: 
Requirements, Issues and Suggestions 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
widely known as P.L. 94-142 or the Education of the Handi-
capped Act (EHA), is a federal statute designed to support 
efforts of state and local agencies to educate children with 
disabilities. One of IDEA's stated purposes is assuring the 
availability of a free appropriate public education (F APE) to all 
children with disabilities. 1 This free appropriate education is 
to (1) be provided at public expense, (2) meet State standards, 
(3) range from preschool through secondary school, and (4) 
conform with Individualized Education Programs (IEPs).2 The 
question of whether or not FAPE is provided is the source of 
considerable litigation, particularly over the cost of services. 
The interests of parents and agencies may be best met if par-
ents and educational agencies appreciate the other's interests 
and constraints and then proceed as partners rather than as 
adversaries. 
II.DETERMINING IF F APE IS PROVIDED 
The Supreme Court took occasion to offer, in Hudson v. 
Rowley, 3 extensive practical interpretation of IDEA. Amy 
Rowley was a deaf elementary school student who, despite her 
disability, was an excellent lip reader. Initially the school pro-
vided a sign-language interpreter, but when the interpreter 
1. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c). 
2. The term "free appropriate public education" means special education 
and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision 
and direction, and without charge, 
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school 
education in the State involved, and 
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram. 
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(18). 
3. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
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reported that Amy did not need him, the school stopped the 
services. Subsequent requests by the Rowleys for an interpreter 
were denied, and suit was brought. The lower courts held in 
favor of the Rowleys, comparing the potential of children with 
disabilities and those without disabilities. The discrepancy of 
potential was to be made up by the school. Weighing Amy's 
potential against the school's responsibility, the Supreme Court 
found that Amy understood less than her classmates and that 
her achievement would no doubt accelerate if she understood 
more. However, as she was performing better than average in 
her classes and advancing easily from grade to grade, the 
school was not required to maximize her potential, but simply 
to provide an educational benefit. 
Acknowledging the broad spectrum of disabilities, the 
Court declined to create any set of educational adequacy crite-
ria, but instead prescribed a flexible two-part query: (1) has the 
State complied with the procedures of IDEA, and (2) is the IEP 
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits.4 This test has important ramifications. First, it sug-
gests that agencies need only provide appropriate opportunities 
in light of the child's disabilities5 , as opposed to ensuring that 
some fixed standard of educational achievement is met. Second-
ly, a detailed analysis of IDEA prompted the Court to conclude 
(over powerful dissents), that the Act's language "to the maxi-
4. ld. at 206, 208. The Court cited 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) which authorizes 
trial courts to review the administrative proceedings and additional evidence and 
base decisions on the preponderance of the evidence. The Court held that de novo 
review was slightly too strong, and that "once a court determines that the require-
ments of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by 
the States." 
5. Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition 
also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public 
expense . . . meet the State's standards, approximate the grade levels 
used in the State's regular education, and comport with the child's 
IEP. Thus if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient 
supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, 
and other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is 
receiving a "free appropriate public education" as defined by the 
Act .... 
Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substan-
tive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handi-
capped children. Certainly the language of the statute contains no 
requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts-that States 
maximize the potential of handicapped children "commensurate with 
the opportunity provided to other children." 
ld. at 189. 
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mum extent appropriate"6 does not require the desirable goal 
of maximizing a child's potential, but rather to provide max-
imum access to a public education. 7 In effect, IDEA is to be 
viewed as a law of process, and not one of outcome. 
The decision of the Court reflects a philosophical change 
from the contemporary perception of educational agencies. Most 
public schools today operate under an industrial factory men-
tality.8 Schools are intended to move all students through the 
system at the same rate, culminating with a standardized 
"graduate." A major flaw in this production theory, as applied 
to public schools, is that schools cannot exercise quality control 
on the raw materials (students) they are provided. Variations 
in students and graduates are therefore to be expected, and 
likewise, the same educational process can not be expected to 
be successful with each student. Individualization of both pro-
cess and expectation is warranted. In this analysis, student 
failure is presumably the fault of an inappropriately individual-
ized process. 9 
Intuitively, the individualization of student educational 
processes has positive aspects. However, in the case of children 
with disabilities, compliance with Rowley requires more than 
good intentions. 
A. Procedural Compliance 
The first prong of the Rowley appropriateness test is com-
pliance with procedural requirements. James Jackson, upon 
release from the East Mississippi State Hospital, where he had 
6. § 1412(5). 
7. 
Desirable though that goal [maximizing the potential of children with 
disabilities] might be, it is not the standard that Congress imposed 
upon States ... Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and 
evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a 
free public education. 
Id. at 200. 
8. See DONNA K. CRAWFORD, THE ScHOOL FOR QUALITY LEARNING: MANAG-
ING THE ScHOOL AND CLASSROOM THE DEMING WAY (1993). 
9. Accepting a management theory of education would require significant 
changes in premises central to the common (public) schools in the United States. 
The significance of letter grades (which generally reflect only performance in com-
parison to other students), credit earned on the basis of time in class (and not in 
relation to any accomplishment or competency), and the notion that children can 
only receive public education from five to eighteen (not drop out until 16, nor come 
back after 18) are examples of historical ideas which might need to be sacrificed 
before a management approach could be implemented in schools. 
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been evaluated and treated after accosting several classmates, 
was denied re-entry to his school. 10 James was sixteen when 
the suit was filed and had been attending special education 
classes in the school system for five years. The school claimed 
that James' presence at school would have threatened his and 
other student's safety. The court, however, held that the exclu-
sion from school was a change in James' educational placement 
and program, and since it had occurred without prior notice or 
hearing, it was a per se violation of the Act's procedural re-
quirements. The clear message of this case and others is that 
failure to meet the procedural requirements of IDEA consti-
tutes F APE violation. 
A case decided after the IDEA's effective date, W.G. v. 
Target, 11 again affirms the importance of procedural require-
ments. Here a school district convened an IEP meeting without 
the participation of the student, the parent, the student's 
teacher, or any representative of the school attended by the 
student, as required by IDEA. 12 As such, the court found that 
the student was effectively denied a F APE. 
In Doe v. Defendant 113 however, an IEP which was defi-
cient in several of the same areas as W. G. was upheld. In this 
case, although previously classified as learning disabled, when 
John Doe entered junior high school, his father requested that 
John be left without special education or assessment to see how 
well he adjusted to school. As a result, IEP specified neither 
what special services were necessary, nor John's current levels 
of performance. John's parents removed him from public school, 
enrolled him in a private facility, and sued for the expense, 
claiming that the school had not complied with IEP re-
quirements. The court did not agree with the parents because 
of their involvement and requests in the IEP development. 
Thus, in Doe v. Defendant I, an IEP without performance 
levels and goals was ruled effective, since the procedural re-
quirements had been followed, although not recorded in the 
document. In W.G., a complete document had been created, but 
without the participation of required team members. IEPs are 
meant to be flexible, and the unique program of John Doe was 
10. Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.23 623 (5th Cir. 1986). 
11. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d 1479 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
12. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(20). 
13. Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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within appropriate parameters. 14 The answer to the first 
prong of the Rowley test, (have IDEA procedures been complied 
with?) is "yes" in the case where all the formalities have been 
observed but not recorded in the IEP, and "no" when important 
substantive elements of the procedural requirements are omit-
ted. 
B. Substantive Compliance 
Even when procedural requirements of IDEA have been 
complied with, an IEP which will enable the child to receive 
educational benefits must also be created. The Court's holding 
in Rowley that children with disabilities need only receive some 
educational benefit, 15 raises the concern of fiscal abuses. This 
concern is illustrated in G.D. v. Westmoreland. 16 The 
Westmoreland School District declined to finance the placement 
of an elementary school child with learning disabilities at a 
private school, even though several professionals had recom-
mended it. Citing Rowley and others, the court concluded that 
any one F APE might not be the only choice, the choice of ex-
perts, the parent's choice, the first choice, or the best choice. A 
placement which is reasonably calculated to provide education-
al benefits, or meets other minimum statutory standards, 
which the court ruled G.D.'s IEP did, is appropriate. 17 The 
focus, implies the court, should be on appropriateness of place-
ment and not alternatives preferred by the family. 
However, in Polk v. Susquehanna/8 the court, also citing 
Rowley, specifically held that IDEA calls for more than trivial 
educational benefit. Christopher Polk had several severe devel-
opmental disabilities, and was not, as Amy Rowley, advancing 
easily from grade to grade. This holding was derived from EHA 
language (substantively unchanged in the IDEA) which re-
quires States to establish a goal of "full educational opportuni-
ty"19 for children with disabilities. The court used this Ian-
14. !d. 
15. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
16. G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1991). 
17. G.D., 930 F.2d at 948. 
18. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3rd 
Cir. 1988). 
19. "[T]here is established [by the State receiving federal assistance] a goal of 
providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1412 (2)(A). 
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guage to conclude that Rowley should be viewed narrowly and 
that meaningful benefit must result from a FAPE. 
Unfortunately Rowley remains the only extensive Supreme 
Court treatment of IDEA. As such, the simple requirement of 
"some benefit" can be read as a relief from duty for educational 
agencies. If a major purpose of the IDEA truly is providing an 
appropriate education for disabled children, the Polk require-
ment of "meaningful benefit," while vague, is the more appro-
priate standard to be applied in determining if a F APE meets 
the substantive requirements of the IDEA. 
Ill. COST 
It is unquestioned that financing FAPEs for disabled chil-
dren is very expensive. 20 To defray great costs, school districts 
often request parental contributions or may eliminate programs 
citing lack of funds. 
A. Parental Contribution 
When a child receives services with no educational pur-
pose, parental contributions may be required. An example of 
this limitation of the "without charge" clause comes from 
Guempel v. State.21 In Guempel, a young woman was placed 
into a State-run residential facility. The court held that place-
ment was not for educational purposes, but for provision of 
basic life care. As such, her family could be required to contrib-
ute to incurred costs. 
Similarly, federal regulations now state that fees incidental 
to education, which would be required from children without 
disabilities, are not waived because of disabilities.22 However, 
20. Nationally, special education costs exceed $30 billion to serve 5 million 
students. Joseph P. Shapiro, Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE· 
PORT, Dec. 13, 1993 at 46. 
21. Guempel v. State, 387 A.2d 399 (N.J. 1978), cert. granted 405 A.2d 824 
(N.J. 1979), modified Lefme v. State Dept. of Institutions and Agencies, 418 A.2d 
229 (N.J. 1980). 
22. At no cost means that all specially designed instruction is provided 
without charge, but does not preclude incidental fees which are nor-
mally charged to non-handicapped students or their parents as a part 
of the regular education program. 
34 C.F.R. § 300.14(b)(l) (1992). 
The Guempel's would typically be expected to provide for their child's food, 
clothing and shelter, and could therefore be expected to continue providing for such 
care even though their daughter was living in a residential facility. Guempel at 
408. 
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the implication in Guempel is that were an IEP team to con-
clude that placement in a public or private residential facility 
was the appropriate setting for educational purposes, the par-
ents would be shielded from contribution.23 
B. Availability of Funds 
Hand in hand with the question of parental contribution 
goes the problem of fund availability. This is treated in Mills v. 
Board of Education.24 A school district which, citing insuffi-
cient funds, had cut the educational benefits of "exceptional" 
children was enjoined from the exclusion. In the decision, the 
court held that: 
[T]he District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded 
children clearly must outweigh its interest in preserving its 
financial resources. If sufficient funds are not available to 
finance all of the services and programs that are needed and 
desirable in the system then the available funds must be 
expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely 
excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with 
his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies 
of the ... public school system whether occasioned by insuffi-
cient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot 
be permitted to bear more heavily on the [disabled] child than 
on [other children].25 
There is to be no preference between children with, and chil-
dren without, disabilities. Equitable distribution is the key. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Exactly what constitutes FAPE is not clearly defined. This 
is actually advantageous. Disabilities themselves are not clear-
ly defined, but are so varied that creative FAPEs should be 
developed which serve the best interests of everyone, especially 
a unique child with a unique disability. Creative solutions 
might arise out of Title I of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act (ADA) which applies to the interaction of employers and 
employees or applicants. The ADA allows employers and their 
employees with disabilities to bargain over what reasonable 
accommodations will be made for the disability. If an employer 
23. See Guempel at 410. 
24. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
25. ld. at 876. 
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cannot afford a specific accommodation, it is appropriate for the 
employee to contribute to the amount the employer is willing to 
offer. It follows that children with disabilities, when confronted 
with the issue of insufficient public funds, would be able to 
contribute the difference the educational agency was truly and 
equitably unable to provide. 
A practical example of this might be a child with a muscu-
lar disability who needs special equipment to write assign-
ments and take notes. Using Title I as a model, the school/child 
interaction could proceed as follows. At the IEP meeting, the 
school representative would make clear that the school has the 
responsibility to make reasonable accommodations for known 
disabilities of otherwise qualified students. The burden would 
shift to the child or parent to explain the problems associated 
with the disability and request special equipment. Although the 
school has the responsibility to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions, it is foreseeable that school and child wishes might not 
coincide, particularly if appropriate equipment is expensive. 
Mter a period of good faith bargaining, the parties could decide 
that the school can contribute only so much without undue 
hardship. At this point the child should have the opportunity to 
make up the difference in cost between what the school is able 
to offer and the accommodation the child would like to receive. 
Both parents and educational agencies have constraints 
which influence their actions. The main concern of parents of 
an exceptional child is the child's life. Educational agencies 
have a derivative concern, that of the child's education. In light 
of this common concern, if parents and schools will appreciate 
the constraints under which the other operates, and work to-
gether as partners to overcome disabilities, free, appropriate 
educations will be provided, and children will be best served. 
Martin W. Bates 
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